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    1. Introduction
“It makes no difference what men think of war, said the judge. War endures. As well ask men what
they think of stone. War was always here. Before man was, war waited for him. The ultimate trade
awaiting the ultimate practitioner. That is the way it was and will be. That way and not some other
way.” (McCarthy 2010: 259)
The Judge, the antagonist of Cormac McCarthy's 'Blood Meridian', is a nihilist. His perspective is
solipsistic. He does not believe in norms guiding cooperative human life, morality, or constraints on
actions  in  general;  he  may be  seen  as  a  poor  man's  interpretation  of  Nietzsche's  Übermensch.
Regarding war, he is an extreme version of what is generally called a  realist:  an adherent to a
discourse  that  promises  “to  spring  politics  free  from  the  constraints  of  moral  judgement  and
limitation” and aims to show “people and states as they really are rather than as we might yearn
them to be” (Elshtain 1985: 40). The opposite extreme is the idea of pacifism – “the unconditional
rejection of war” rooted in the conviction “that it is always wrong to go to war” (Norman 1988:
198). As of today, realist ideas are still practised by some belligerents, but its discursive hegemony
has vanished; the idea that war has to succumb to some restrictions and guidelines is treated as
common sense and has found detailed institutionalization in  international  law and its  regimes.1
Pacifism,  on  the  other  hand,  is  still  very much alive,  both  in  moral  philosophy and in  public
deliberation. Still, its doctrine arguably does not fit the political realities.
A third way is located between the two extremes: just war theory. In a nutshell, it says that both the
decision to go to war and fighting in war can be just, but solely under some specific circumstances.
Those  circumstances  allowing  combatants  to  wage  war  are  incorporated  in  two  overarching
principles: justice in the resort to war, ius ad bellum, and justice in the conduct of war, ius in bello.
Coupled with a new category,  ius post bellum, concerning the duties imposed on war parties after
war is finished, those two considerations are the core of the just war theory. Contrary to common
belief, those are not genuinely modern categories. Thinking about the justness of warfare originated
even before Christianity arose, and thinkers as diverse as Saint Augustine and Hugo Grotius have
since rediscovered it as a subject of practical philosophy (Reichberg, Syse & Begby 2016: 70-90,
385-438).  However,  deliberations  on  war  have  only  come  to  the  forefront  of  ethics  after  the
genocidal rupture and general barbarity of World War Two and the holocaust; especially the in bello
1 There are a great number of examples to punctuate this point: Mainly, the Geneva Conventions and their additional 
protocols, the UN Security Council and the International Criminal Court are regimes dedicated to governing 
international conflict and war.
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conduct has been controversially debated ever since. Traditionally, there are certain principles that
combatants have to adhere to in order to wage just war. These principles govern every action in war
and can be summarised as follows: necessity, meaning only those acts necessary to the achievement
of  military objectives  may be  carried  out,  non-combatant  immunity,  meaning only soldiers  are
legitimate targets of harm who may always target each other, and proportionality, referring to the
notion that every action must be proportionate to the good combatants produce by acting as they do
(Fabre 2012: 5)2.  These doctrines have become utterly prominent,  and have found reflection in
international humanitarian law (see First additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions: Articles
48, 51 (4b), 57).
However, the absolute validity of those conventions has recently been contested by a loose group of
scholars and theories adhering to what is commonly called  revisionist just war theory.  Inter alia,
they  have  questioned  absolute  civilian  immunity  and  hold,  pace traditionalists,  that  individual
soldiers fighting for what can be deemed a wrongful cause are not morally permitted to inflict harm
(Lazar 2017: 1). While revisionists currently dominate the discourse on just war, there is plenty of
tension between the traditionalist and revisionist camps. This is because revisionism is not merely a
refinement of traditionalism but aspires to be an utter refutation of the latter's core principles, at
least concerning the in bello doctrines. Generally classified as an adherent to the broader revisionist
movement, Cecile Fabre's theory of a cosmopolitan war is both an extreme example of renunciation
of the traditionalist principles and an innovative refinement of the debates' trend to question the
importance of the nation-state as war's fundamental actor (c.f. Lazar 2014). Her theory is about
cosmopolitan justice in war; she locates the ultimate unit of concern not in states, but in individual
humans, and argues that the rules of warfare have to be deduced of the individual rights and duties
all moral agents possess, regardless of national boundaries (Fabre 2012: 1-15). Much like other
revisionist theories, Fabre's cosmopolitan war negates most of the  in bello considerations set by
traditionalists,  especially  questioning  the  previous  account  of  combatant  and  non-combatant
liability.
In this Bachelor's thesis, I strive to reveal the reason underlying the fundamental incongruity of the
traditionalist  and  cosmopolitan  strains  in  the  discourse  on  ius  in  bello.  My hypothesis  is  the
following:  traditionalist  and  cosmopolitan  rules  of  ius  in  bello are  incompatible  because  the
normative ethics grounding them are diametrically opposed. While traditionalist principles of the
just conduct in war are subject to consequentialist, especially rule-consequentialist, considerations,
the cosmopolitan rules of  in bello behaviour are deduced from deontological, especially Kantian,
2 The most important and widely celebrated work on traditionalist theory is Just and Unjust Wars (1977) by Michael 
Walzer.
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axioms. Thus, as the two theories of normative ethics are irreconcilable, the doctrines arising from
their  respective  application  are  as  well.  To  my  knowledge,  neither  has  this  hypothesis  been
examined before, nor has the oppugnancy of the revisionist and traditionalist sides of this discourse
on just war been explained as a clash of different normative theories. 
Exploring this research question is relevant mainly for three reasons. First, it  sheds light on the
discourse surrounding questions on the just conduct in war. It both introduces the reader to the main
properties traditionalists and revisionists employ and illuminates the source of their disparity. This,
in  turn,  attracts  attention to  the astounding implication theoretical  axioms on morality have on
practical,  life-or-death  decisions  combatants  are  faced  with  every  day.  My  thesis  shall  hence
contribute to the appreciation of theoretical concepts. Second, the research question and hypothesis
proposed combine two separate, but closely intertwined branches of philosophical ethics: normative
and  applied  ethics.  The hypothesis,  if  confirmed,  adds  evidence  to  the  notion  that  one  cannot
possibly study the morality of every-day actions of all  sorts without resorting to the theoretical
foundations of ethics. It shall remind moral and political philosophers working on war that their
theories are built upon their own pivotal inclination for different kinds of normative ethics and thus
rejects the notion that there is one overarching ethically 'true' principle of the moral behaviour in
war, instead encouraging philosophers to think outside the box of their own moral predispositions.
Third, if confirmed, the hypothesis would certainly contribute to the furthering of philosophy in the
area of just war, since a direct link between normative ethics and in bello conduct has not yet been
established.
Obviously, as I examine two vast fields of ethics, I am confronted with immeasurable amounts of
literature. Identifying and integrating the relevant works both on just war and normative ethics is
thus one of the main challenges this paper faces. I will hence proceed as follows: Regarding the
normative ethics of Kantianism and consequentialism, I will largely restrict myself to using the
canonical information, relying heavily on academic encyclopedias, overviews as secondary sources
and greatly influential papers. Some of the most important works I use are The Oxford Handbook of
Ethical Theory edited by David Copp (2006), The Routledge Companion to Ethics edited by John
Skorupski (2010) and Shelly Kagans Normative Ethics (1998), among others. Regarding the debate
on in bello considerations, the used literature is considerably more diverse and extensive. As I have
to cover the great range of this debate, monographs as well as edited books and journal articles are
used in ample fashion. Moreover, most of the literature I use here can be classified as primary
sources, meaning that I work directly with a work of philosophy rather than extracting information
about other works. Some of the most important texts used include  Cosmopolitan War by Cecile
Fabre (2012),  Killing in War by Jeff McMahan (2009),  Just and Unjust Wars by Michael Walzer
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(the 2006 edition) and various articles by Seth Lazar (2012, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017). 
The thesis will be organised as follows. In section two, I will give a short introduction to the key
concepts this paper works with, namely Kantianism, consequentialism, cosmopolitanism and the
difference  between  combatants  and  non-combatants.  This  part  is  exclusively  descriptive  and
discusses  the  scientific  intricacies  and  possible  definitions  these  notions  are  subjected  to.
Subsequently,  section  three  enshrines  the  discussion  of  the  research  question  as  previously
demonstrated.  First  off,  in  sections  3.1 to  3.1.4,  I  will  discuss  the traditional  principles  of just
conduct in war – discrimination, proportionality, and necessity – at length, before introducing an
exception  to  non-combatant  immunity  conceived  by  Michael  Walzer,  the  supreme  emergency
exemption. Afterwards, I will turn to the first analytic part,  arguing in section 3.2 that all those
principles and the exemption are essentially act- or rule-consequentialist properties. Thereupon, I
will repeat this procedure, illuminating the cosmopolitan theory's stance on  in bello killing, and
focusing especially on the liability of combatants and non-combatants in 3.3, before subsequently
arguing that the cosmopolitan principles of the just conduct of war are grounded upon the Kantian
version of deontology in 3.4. In the conclusion, I aim to reiterate key outcomes of my analysis
before going on to evaluate if my original hypothesis holds up or has to be discarded.
2. Characterisations and Definitions
Grappling  with  abstract  concepts  found  within  the  realms  of  philosophy,  like  Kantianism,
consequentialism or  cosmopolitanism,  I  am aware  that  this  thesis  might  bewilder  a  reader  not
intimately familiar with those considerations and the discourses surrounding them. Therefore, this
following  introductory chapter  is  inserted  in  order  to  bring  about  clarity  regarding  the  central
concepts this paper examines. I will define and characterise three philosophical notions, Kantianism
as a version of deontology, cosmopolitanism, and consequentialism as teleology, and illuminate one
legal distinction – the difference between combatants and non-combatants. In order to do so, I aim
to reduce the philosophical concepts to their core, as all of them are the subject of enormous bodies
of literature that cannot, for reasons of space and structure, be thoroughly examined in this paper. In
practice, this may imply taking philosophical shortcuts that are not fully representative of the entire
reasoning brought forward in regard to those concepts. However, taking these shortcuts allows for a
concise summary of the thought-processes central to those notions as well as the proposition of
clear-cut definitions which should prove able to guide the reader through the entirety of this paper.
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2.1 Kantianism as Deontology
Defining what is meant by the term 'Kantianism' is crucial for several reasons. First, it is a loose
term that may otherwise be interpreted as one sees fit, since, on the surface, it merely addresses a
myriad  of  ideas  that  originated  with  Kant.  It  is  paramount  for  this  paper  to  distinguish  those
'Kantian' paradigms that are relevant for the concept of cosmopolitanism. Kant himself was a great
proponent of a philosophical and political cosmopolitanism, as one can observe in his theories of
peace and law (Höffe 2001: 28-32). However, elaborating on his particular view on cosmopolitan
principles would miss the point: in order to work with a conception of Kantianism in this paper's
context, we need to extract the core constituents of Kant's view on morality, so that it can then be
shown  that  the  kind  of  moral  cosmopolitanism  examined  here  descends  from  Kant's  moral
foundations. Those moral foundations can be characterized by certain traits. In the following, I will
present some integral features of Kant's thought on morality in order to end up at a definition of
Kantianism that combines those essentials and may serve as a fitting groundwork for this paper's
elaboration on cosmopolitan paradigms.
First off, the central question regarding Kant's view on morality has to concern the principle he
proposes  to  guide  actors  towards  moral  soundness.  This  is  the  heart  of  his  moral  theory:  the
categorical  imperative  (from  now  on:  CI),  which  is  dynamically  developed  by  Kant  in  the
Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, and ultimately threefold, but is in its most common, and,
for the ends of this paper, sufficient form formulated like this: “Act only according to that maxim
whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law [without contradiction,
note].” (Kant, Wood & Schneewind 2002: 37). While this formula is well known even outside of
the  academic  sphere,  it  is  worth  the  effort  to  shed  some  light  on  why Kant  regards  it  as  an
'imperative'  and why this  imperative is  'categorical'.  In order to do so,  it  is  sufficient  to  quote
Johnson & Cureton (2016), who give an eloquent explanation: 
“It is an imperative because it is a command addressed to agents who could follow it but might not
[...]. It is categorical in virtue of applying to us unconditionally, or simply because we possesses
[sic]  rational wills, without reference to any ends that we might or might not have. It does not, in
other  words,  apply to  us  on  the  condition  that  we  have  antecedently adopted  some goal  for
ourselves.”
In Kant's view, hence, the path to moral goodness rests on unconditional adherence to the principle
of reflecting upon one's actions, and executing only those actions whose overarching maxims are
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conceivably eligible to be established as universal, morally impeccable laws. This implies that Kant
positions actions per se as the fundamental loci of moral relevance, and is therefore, barring very
few exceptions,  not  concerned with their  consequences.  “Rightness,  on the standard reading of
Kant, is not grounded in the value of outcomes or character.” (ibid). Kant certainly seems to be a
philosopher “who rejects the idea that what makes actions right is primarily their relationship to
what good may come of those actions, someone who rejects outright the act consequentialist form
of teleology.” (Johnson & Cureton 2016). While I will examine consequentialist forms of morality
in another chapter, this leads to an insight of great significance: The crucial trait of Kant's moral
philosophy is the instruction that ends never ex ante justify the means employed to pursue them. In
fact, according to the CI, there are great constraints on every action one executes, regardless of the
value of their potential consequences; moral rightness is a category that is fundamentally separate
from the good, opposing to, say, utilitarian considerations (Robertson 2010: 440). This means that
Kantianism is  a  variety of  deontology,  a  school  of  ethics  that  regards  an action's  adherence  to
righteous  norms  as  paramount  for  its  moral  acceptability  (Alexander,  Moore  2016).  This  is
important to keep in mind.
Back to Kant's thinking on morality, it has to be stressed once again that his ethical philosophy
originates from and is concerned with the individual subject, and this subject's rights and duties;
every comprehensive subject is equal in those rights and duties. Consequently, this paradigm in
itself entails some notion of cosmopolitanism. As Kleingeld explains, 
“[...] all human beings, qua rational beings, are members of a single moral community. They can be
called 'citizens' in this 'moral world' because they are conceived of as free and equal co-legislators
of moral law and, as such, are analogous to citizens of a political state.” (Kleingeld 2000: 314)
This emphasizes the ethical irrelevance of man-made state boundaries in respect to fundamental
rights and duties we demand for ourselves and owe to others (for example Kleingeld: 313-341).
Thus, we can conclude that another central pillar of 'Kantianism' is concerned with the notion that
all  human beings  are  equal  moral subjects,  who constantly participate  in  morality as they owe
duties to others and demand rights for themselves. We may therefore call his ethics universal (see
Dower 2009: 72f.).
Now that I have established the central concepts on Kantian ethics in respect to the aims of this
paper, I can move on to combine those traits in a uniting definition. The central ethical principles
established are 1) the command of adherence to the categorical imperative, which 2) originates
from the paradigm of the centrality of fundamental rights and duties ascribed to morally equal
8
individual subjects and 3) prescribes inherent moral worth only to actions  per se,  and not their
possible consequences and has to be regarded as 4) universally valid, without particular respect to
political boundaries. One may therefore call any deliberation or consideration that builds upon all
four of those paradigms 'Kantian', or Kantian specifications of deontology.
2.2 Cosmopolitanism
“Asked where he came from, he said, 'I am a citizen of the world.'” (Diogenes Laertius 1958: 65)
As Diogenes  of  Sinope makes  clear,  and further  supported  by some of  Kant's  thoughts  I  just
reflected upon, the cosmopolitan idea of world citizenship has been present throughout most of
human  history.  Still,  it  is  not  imminently  clear  what  exactly  one  means  when  referring  to
'cosmopolitanism'. While 'cosmopolitan' may in everyday language allude to an attitude of “worldly
sophistication”,  it  is  of  a  more  complicated  nature  within  philosophy  (Scheffler  2001:  111).
Scholars have wildly debated the morality of cosmopolitanism and its implications in recent years3,
some proposing cosmopolitan values as the gateway to overcoming nationalism (see Nussbaum &
Cohen 1996), others discerning cosmopolitanism as a feat impossible to coherently achieve (see
Sandel 1982). While there is political, or, more precisely, institutional cosmopolitanism, an effort
concerned with translating cosmopolitan ideals of various shapes into institutions of supra- and
transnational applicability, and cultural cosmopolitanism, concerned with the idea that the forging
of individual identities is not determined by membership in a clearly defined cultural group, but
dynamic  and  constantly  modified  by  a  myriad  of  influences,  this  paper's  focus  on  ethical
perspectives  demands  an  examination  of  moral cosmopolitanism  (for  example  Cabrera  2004,
Waldron 2000).  Following Samuel Scheffler, one may categorize this as “cosmopolitanism about
justice” (Scheffler 2001: 112). Cosmopolitanism about justice combats the idea that “the norms of
justice apply primarily within bounded groups comprising some subset of the global population”,
thereby  not  only  opposing  communitarian  thought,  but  also  Rawlsian  liberalism  that  insists
principles  of  justice  are,  for  reasons  of  reciprocal  advantages,  best  applied  in  single  societies
(Scheffler 2001: 112ff.). It is paramount to stress that any allusion to 'the norms of justice' does not
allude to a technical understanding of jurisprudence and its procedures, but is dedicated to justice
qua morality (e.g. Kleingeld & Brown 2013).
In order to find a definition of cosmopolitanism that applies to individual rights and duties in war,
3 Some important examples: Kymlicka 2001, Waldron 1992, Pogge 1992.
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delving deeper into this cosmopolitanism about justice is the way to go. Now that it is clear that a
definition focusing on rights and duties – applicable to the question of killing in war – is needed,
we may move on to depict some thoughts by cosmopolitan thinkers within that very context. 
In his attempt at a definition of a global cosmopolitan ethic, Nigel Dower alleges that
“[...]  it  would  need  to  be  concerned  not  merely  with  how  one  behaves  in  relation  to  war
(concerning decisions about how or in what circumstances one fights or whether to fight at all), but
with promoting certain values.” (Dower 2009: 64)
While it is certainly true that cosmopolitans ascribe a great deal of importance to certain values that
originate with the fundamental rights and duties every moral agent individually possesses, it is not
clear why a definition of cosmopolitanism should include the requirement of actively promoting
these values. As we have already established the key norm moral cosmopolitans stand for, namely
world-wide  validity  of  the  norms  of  justice,  the  key  to  finding  a  satisfying  definition  of
cosmopolitanism applicable to  conduct  in  warfare lies  in  defining  which aspects  of  this  rather
vague allusion to transnational justice are the most basic,  in the sense that all  other aspects of
justice may be deduced from them. Cécile Fabre calls this a sufficientist, or rights-based, account of
cosmopolitan justice. The basic principle of this endeavour is the declaration that 
“all individuals [...] have rights to the freedoms and resources which they need in order to lead a
minimally decent life, wherever they reside.” (Fabre 2012: 33)4
Focusing on everyone's right to lead a minimally decent life, it is apparent that Fabre is headed
towards a minimal definition of cosmopolitanism. This fits her needs; laying out a cosmopolitan
theory of morality in warfare, a definition of moral cosmopolitanism needs to be both robust in its
core principles but yet able to encompass a great deal of phenomena. To further her notion of what
characterizes a rights-based cosmopolitan theory: “all individuals are under the relevant correlative
duties to rights-bearers, irrespective of political borders.” (Ibid). Thus, the limitless scope of the
right to lead a minimally decent life is coupled with the corresponding need to establish universal
esteem for these rights qua the duty to respect them. At this point, it has to be mentioned that these
duties are both positive and negative, as Fabre obligates all individuals to refrain from supporting or
taking part in practices undermining that basic right and holds that all individuals are under the duty
to construct universally just legislation and institutions or support those pledging to construct them
(Fabre 2012: 36). We can complement the aforementioned with a general starting point given by
4 For the full argument defending this paradigm see Fabre 2012: 31-37.
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Fabre:
“Cosmopolitanism is the view that human beings are the fundamental and primary loci for moral
concern and respect and have equal moral worth. It is individualist, egalitarian, and universal, and
insists that political borders are arbitrary from a moral point of view, and more precisely ought not
to have a bearing on individuals' prospects for a flourishing life.” (Fabre 2012: 16)
Note that this is not yet the final definition this chapter longs for. In order to receive a satisfying
definition of moral cosmopolitanism that is applicable to its employment within the realms of just
war theory, the transpired traits have to be combined. Thus, in respect to the aim of grappling with
developments within just war theory, one may call every mindset, approach and paradigm ethically
cosmopolitan which 1) ascribes every human being a right to lead a minimally decent life,  2)
introduces a general duty for all individuals to respect this right, and 3) disregards political borders
and other institutions or practices separating human beings as morally arbitrary and meaningless.
The next chapter will examine a different concept: the normative ethics of consequentialism.
2.3 (Rule-)Consequentialism as Teleology
While consequentialism “forms a large and heterogeneous family of moral theories”, encompassing
such different forms as act-consequentialism, impartial and partial consequentialism, utilitarianism,
virtue  consequentialism  and  so  on,  there  certainly  is  a  set  of  common  denominators  which
transcend these specializations and explain why they operate on a very similar moral ground (Brink
2006: 384).
“What all consequentialists about the morality of acts agree on is that, where there are differences
in  the  value  of  consequences,  these  are  always,  directly  or  indirectly,  decisive  in  the  moral
evaluation of acts.” (Hooker 2010: 444f.).
This  means  that  consequentialists  do  not  regard  other  factors  besides  the  value  of  an  act's
consequences as critical for the determination of this act's status as right or wrong. As even if some
other  considerations  would  come  into  play,  none  of  them  could  trump  the  paramountcy  of
consequences.  Hence,  as  opposed  to  Kantianism,  consequentialism  is  not  deontological,  but
teleological. According to Rawls, teleological moral theories are distinguished by being  
11
“[...] those that first specify the good independently of the right and then define moral rightness as
that which maximizes the good.” (Robertson 2010: 440).
While it is disputed that teleologists such as consequentialists need to necessarily maximize good
instead  of  limiting  themselves  to  outcomes  that  are  good  enough5,  specifying  the  good
independently of the right is a major feature putting consequentialism in opposition to deontological
moral theories such as Kantianism. For the purposes of this paper, it is important to grapple with the
implications of understanding consequentialism in terms of shaping the pillars of a latent structure,
in this case just war theory; this is, cautiously speaking, quite unusual, as consequentialism, like any
other moral theory, is primarily applied to individual acts. Therefore, in order to grasp the logic of
the structure of rules just war theory has set, it is rewarding to turn to one of the sub-specifications
of consequentialism: rule–consequentialism, coined and defended by Brad Hooker.
While still a challenging endeavour, working with this subtype allows for a greater applicability of
this normative moral theory to the arrangement of rules within just war theory than closely related
subtypes, as, say, act-consequentialism. In a nutshell, one can break it down as follows:
“[...] rule-consequentialism holds that an act is morally permissible if it is allowed by the rules
whose general acceptance (including the costs of getting them accepted) has the greatest expect
value.” (Hooker 2010: 453)
It is important to note that while this sort of morality follows one or multiple general rule(s), it is
still a teleological rather than a deontological variety of morality, since the validity of the rule is
constituted by the value of its consequences. Furthermore, it has to be added that the expected value
brought upon by a general rule is decidedly agent-neutral, meaning that rules are selected by their
potential  positive  effect  on  no  particular  agent,  but  the  welfare  of  all  agents  (or  as  many as
possible). This implies an agent-neutral justification of rules, while the content of rules themselves
are mostly agent-relative. To exemplify:
“The constraint of attacking others, for example, is the duty not to attack oneself, not the duty to
minimize instances of attacks by agents generally.” (Hooker 2010: 454).
This example, unintentionally but conveniently, already leads us to war and the constraints in place
to guide it according to ethical considerations; the fact that this particular author chose a war-related
scenario to illuminate his point may serve us as prima facie evidence for the applicability of rule-
5 For an influential argument in favour of satisficing consequentialism, see Slote & Pettit 1984. 
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consequentialism to scenarios of war. 
2.4 Combatants and Non-Combatants
Finally,  it  is  important  to  define  and  distinguish  combatants  and  non-combatants,  as  ethical
guidelines for warfare have put a fundamental distinction between the two sets of agents. Thus,
while these are predominantly legal terms, they apply to ethical perspectives on warfare as well.
According to the Geneva Convention, combatants are “all members of the armed forces of a party
to the conflict […], except medical and religious personnel” (International Committee of the Red
Cross 2016). A non-combatant therefore does not engage in combat; he is either a civilian, meaning
not declared as active personnel in the armed service or the police, or a member of the armed forces
who is, by article three of the Geneva Convention, not regarded as a combatant and therefore not
fighting  –  this  includes  primarily  medical,  psychological  and  religious  staff  (Merriam Webster
2016:  Noncombatant  [sic],  Merriam Webster  2016:  Civilian).  Therefore,  all  civilians  are  non-
combatants,  but  not  all  non-combatants  are  civilians.  Authors  in  the Just  War  Theory tradition
adhere to the legal definition of combatant, non-combatant and civilians in their writings, although
it is generally accepted that there is no moral difference between non-combatants and civilians (see
Primoratz 2011, Bellamy 2004, Walzer 2006). With those definitions and characterisations in mind,
it is now time to move on to ius in bello and accounts of permissible killing.
3. Ius in Bello
Reflections on the morality of warfare are usually conducted in three steps, each of which has their
own rules, criteria, and reasoning. These three structures are commonly called ius ad bellum, ius in
bello,  and,  established more  recently, ius  post  bellum.  Traditional  just  war  theorists  regard  the
distinction between those categories as utterly important. As Michael Walzer (2006: 21) puts it:
“The first kind of judgement is adjectival in character: we say that a particular war is just or unjust.
The second is adverbial: we say that the war is being fought just or unjustly.  […] Ius ad bellum
requires  us  to  make  judgements  about  aggression  and  self-defense;  ius  in  bello  about  the
observance or  violation of  the customary and positive  rules  of  engagement.  The two sorts  of
judgements are logically independent.”
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While there is some serious disagreement concerning the separate nature of those considerations,
the  point  of  traditional  just  war  theorists  is  that  each  of  those  three  phases  grapples  with
fundamentally different problems (McMahan 2009). Thus, while  ius ad bellum  is the sphere for
deliberation about which ex ante conditions allow warfare and ius post bellum concerns itself with
ex post questions of what is owed after war (restitution, reconstruction, and so forth), ius in bello is
proposed to be the independent ethical structure setting moral rules for what may be done, and, in
reverse,  what may  not  be done in  order to achieve the end of winning war (Allhoff,  Evans &
Henschke 2013: 2). This is the baseline of the traditionalist account of ius in bello, which is going to
be explored in the following segment.
3.1 Traditional Ius in Bello and its Account of Permissible Killing
Rather obviously, ius in bello is concerned with the use of intense – and possibly lethal – force in
war. In short, it tries to answer the questions of under which conditions an actor may resort to using
deadly force, who can through which actions possibly become liable to suffer the use of severe
force, and to which extent and scope force can be used justly. Traditionally, these deliberations are
summed  up  by  three  principles  which  are,  mutatis  mutandis,  reflected  in  international  law:
discrimination, proportionality, and necessity (Lazar 2016). In the view of traditionalist just war
scholars,  they represent  the  central  pillars  of  just  fighting.  In  the  next  four  subsections,  I  will
explore  those  principles  and  the  one  rare  instance  in  which  they  may  be  annulled,  supreme
emergency, and trace the line(s) of thought which led to their consolidation.
3.1.1 Discrimination
The imperative of discrimination means that war parties of any sort have to distinguish between
combatants and non-combatants and may only attack fellow combatants; civilians are off-limits.
Every violent act in war has to be discriminatory in this regard. Interestingly, early post-world-war-
two discourse about the principle of discrimination and non-combatant immunity has drawn heavily
on notions of guilt and innocence in order to determine who is liable to be attacked, a thread that
modern  revisionists  have  picked  up  again;  still,  the  most  influential  argument  in  favour  of
discrimination  has  been  brought  forward  by Michael  Walzer  and  the  just  war  theorists  of  his
generation (Anscombe 1961, Ramsey 2002, Walzer 2006). It begins with the ethical consensus that
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human beings have a basic right to life. Therefore,
“no one can be forced to fight or risk his life, no one can be threatened by war or warred against,
unless through some act of his own he has surrendered or lost his rights.” (Walzer 2006: 135)
So far, this merely reiterates basic human rights. However, by fighting, combatants lose this right to
life and liberty, although a soldier may have committed no crime (Walzer 2006: 136). Lazar sums
up:
“[…] merely by posing a threat to me, a person alienates himself from me, and from our common
humanity, and so himself becomes a legitimate target of lethal force.” (Lazar 2016)
Although vague, this line of thought clearly aims at the concept that soldiers have forfeited their
inherent right to life, while non-combatants have not. As might by now be apparent, the central
notion employed here is the concept of  self-defence.  This line of thought draws on an analogy
between self-defence in civilian situations and self-defence in war, as it is argued that there is no
substantial moral difference between them. Therefore, the only reason why non-combatants should
be immune to impairment is that they do not pose an active threat to anyone; in turn, the only
reason one might become liable to endure serious harm or death is that one poses an active physical
hazard  to  anyone.  (Fullinwinder  1975:  92-95,  Nagel  1972:  138f.).  This  justification  of
discrimination prescribes itself the merit of being logically satisfying and, especially, eliminating all
of the implications more vague distinctions on the basis on harm and innocence would entail; it
delivers a clear-cut frame for morally permissible and impermissible killings in war. This leads us
to another  key principle  following logically from this justification of  discrimination:  the moral
equality of combatants. If the only relevant moral difference between persons possibly affected by
fighting is their status as being either combatant or non-combatant, then the sort of combatant one
may be is entirely irrelevant. According to Walzer, all combatants share the same moral status: it
does not matter if they fight for a just or an unjust cause; a soldier fighting for Hitler's army enjoys
the same moral status as a soldier fighting for France's territorial self-defence, since all combatants
are  threats  to  others  and therefore  forfeit  the  right  to  life  (Walzer  2006:  34-40).  This  follows
logically  from  the  doctrine  that  ius  ad  bellum and  ius  in  bello are  two  completely  separate
considerations:
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“If, however, what combatants are permitted to do in war is independent of whether their war is
just or unjust, or legal or illegal, their individual moral status must be independent of the moral
character of their war.” (McMahan 2009: 4)
While I will look at potential issues and underlying moral themes of this line of thought at the end
of the traditional ius in bello chapter, one can already retain that, while well argued, the approach of
leaving  notions  of  guilt  and  innocence  out  of  deliberations  about  liability  will  seem counter-
intuitive for a lot of people: it appears very technical and has been accused of sacrificing immediate
rightfulness for the long term good – consequences (McMahan 2009: 1-32). This underlying thread
will materialize starkly as I proceed to illustrate the traditional requirements for acting justly  in
bello. In the following, I will depict the concept of proportionality. 
3.1.2 Proportionality
One of the key requirements belligerents have to adhere to in order to fight justly, in traditional
ethical view, is proportionality. As we have learned in the last section, deliberately targeting non-
combatants is traditionally impermissible; proportionality has been established as a key requirement
in  order  to  govern  unintentional  killing  of  civilians,  or,  to  use  a  well-established  euphemism,
collateral damage, while also introducing those constraints to the entirety of war (Mavrodes 1975:
119). 
“[…] the in bello proportionality condition says the collateral killing of civilians is forbidden if the
resulting civilian deaths are out of proportion to the relevant good one's act will do; excessive force
is wrong.” (Hurka 2005: 36)
This implies several things. First of all, the killing of non-combatants in war is neither morally nor
legally  prohibited  without  exception:  just  the  intended killing  of  non-combatants  is.  Secondly,
proportionality caters to the reality of war, in which civilians often get hurt or killed, and is a means
to try to limit those cases of civilian casualties to a bare minimum: the cases in which civilian
casualties are justified by the amount of good the attacking act does. However,  it  is intuitively
difficult, if not impossible, to weigh expected goods against the evil of killing civilians, or the use
of excessive force in general, for that matter (Hurka 2005: 38). The principle of proportionality has
often been formulated in terms of means and ends: military means have to be proportionate to
legitimate military ends (O'Brien 1981: 40). 
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To give some clarification, Hurka (2005: 39-66) tries to identify the exact relevant goods and the
method  of  comparing  them  with  the  evils  of  unnecessary  deaths,  in  order  to  determine  if
proportionality is given. Interestingly, he concludes that the relevant goods produced in war cannot
be determined independently of the cause this war serves: a war party fighting for an unjust cause
can never achieve any relevant goods. This undermines the doctrine that ius ad bellum and ius in
bello are to be considered separately. Regarding the moral comparison between achieved goods and
evils  done,  he holds  that  lives are  always of equal  worth,  regardless of their  being soldiers  or
civilians, and on what side they are on. It follows that any act killing more civilians than it saves
soldiers is generally impermissible. However, as he admits, this entails speculative decision-making
in  regards  to  future  acts  which  “are  merely hypothetical  and can  only be estimated  given our
available evidence”, and also includes the difficulty of weighing effects who “are of irreducibly
different types” (Hurka 2005: 66). Still, this is an inevitably ambivalent formula, the applicability of
which,  it seems, has to be considered before every single war act that entails the possibility of
excessive force. Therefore, while it may certainly have a strong  prima facie claim to legitimacy and
one can intrinsically understand why proportionality in warfare is important, it is a criterion that
ultimately suffers from its inherent vagueness, and the traditional form of which has been fiercely
challenged (McMahan 2016) .
3.1.3 Necessity
Undoubtedly, necessity is a central requirement of both ius ad bellum and, mutatis mutandis, ius in
bello. However, it has long been neglected by scholars of just war theory and moral philosophers in
general (Lazar 2012: 4). This seems bewildering, as necessity certainly is a central norm regarding
all forms of harm alike, governing principles of individual self-defence as it does the just conduct of
war. Its baseline is quite simple: “Defensive harm H is necessary to avert unjustified threat T if and
only if Defender cannot avert T without inflicting H.” (Lazar 2012: 5). But how, exactly, does this
pertain to  ius in bello,  for which it is, traditionally, no longer relevant if the threats faced by war
parties have originated from just defence, but rather, in which situations it is permissible to use
force in order to achieve the end of winning the war? If necessity in bello simply concerns the issue
of when it is permissible to use force, it appears to be the same thing as proportionality. However,
this is not true. To put it simply: The necessity condition precedes the proportionality condition. In
order to defend against an attack, after having figured out one or many way(s) able to block the
attack, defender D has to first figure out the least harmful way to block, among all the possibilities,
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before deciding whether this act is actually proportionate to the threat posed (Statman 2011: 436f.).
Still, this line of thought seems to merely apply to past attacks, and therefore not quite suitable for
the reality of war. Fittingly, it is transformed to include a future perspective: 
“[…] states might be allowed to respond to a perceived unjust attack against them with an attack
which is much harsher and more destructive than the one they themselves suffered if they have a
reasonable basis for believing that such a response is necessary to block future attacks.” (Statman
2011: 438f.)
As one can observe, the necessity requirement in its traditional form pertains to both ius ad bellum
and ius in bello in the same way: just as a war party has to decide, ad bellum, if a strike against a
foreign power is the least harmful option to defend its right, a war party in bello has to decide if the
particular war act it contemplates is the least harmful option to achieve its aim (McMahan 2016:
21). It is thus a precondition that has to be met in order to even advance to the testing of whether an
act meets the proportionality condition. Together with discrimination, these principles traditionally
build the moral grounding of just conduct of war. Again, similar to the principle of proportionality,
and  even  discrimination,  there  are  several  issues  with  this  traditional  view  of  the  necessity
requirement,  some of which are going to  be of interest  in the section depicting the underlying
consequentialism in traditional  in bello scholarship (Lazar 2012, Statman 2011, McMahan 2016).
Before I go on to that section, however, there is one more component of traditional ius in bello left
to clarify and analyse: the supreme emergency exemption.
3.1.4 Supreme Emergency
6The institutionalization of the concept of supreme emergency,  previously a vague idea at most,
within  just  war  theory was  introduced by Michael  Walzer  in  Just  and Unjust  Wars  (originally
published in 1997, the 2006 edition is cited here). Ever since it has been treated as part of a fixed
canon of  considerations within  ius in  bello,  criticized by some but  accepted within the greater
discourse about  morally just  warfare,  even provoking arguments  in  slightly different  areas  that
clearly lean on its line of thought (see Held 2004). All this might be surprising at first; Walzer's
scenario of a supreme emergency explicitly allows and might even call for intentional, lethal and
indiscriminate attacks against civilians. (Walzer 2006: 251-255, Coady 2004: 777-783).  Employing
6 Most of what is said in this section has been used exactly or almost exactly like this in a previous paper by myself. 
One can find this previous work in the references under Schmid 2016: 36-38.
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the example of Nazi aggression, Walzer limits the eligibility of deliberate killings of civilians in war
to cases that present
“an ultimate threat to everything decent in our lives, […] a practice of domination so murderous,
so degrading even to those who might survive, that  the consequences of its final victory were
literally beyond calculation, immeasurably awful. We see it […] as evil objectified in the world
[…]. (Walzer 2006: 253)
Thus, the very substance of the concept of supreme emergency is that there are some, very rare,
situations in war, in which the usual  in bello  requirement of discrimination no longer applies: in
these cases, innocent non-combatants may be sacrificed in order to secure to the greater good.
Walzer's only example of such a case is Nazi imperialism and the subsequent (last resort!) British
indiscriminate bombing of German cities up until mid-1942; in the last two and a half years of
World  War  II,  the  bombing  was,  in  Walzer's  opinion,  not  absolutely  necessary  and  therefore
transgressing against ius in bello requirements; there was no supreme emergency anymore (Walzer
2006:  255-262).  Thus,  while  ignoring  the  discrimination  requirement,  supreme emergency still
inherently adheres  to  necessity and proportionality:  one could say that,  in  crises that  represent
supreme emergencies, ignoring discrimination is both necessary and proportional (Walzer 2006:
255). While this sounds cruel, and is not incorporated in international law, Walzer's idea pertains
only to situations in which humanity itself and the very prevalence of the world as we know it are
at stake. Still, this is rather vague and, it has been argued, may prove a dangerous provision to
misinterpret and misuse – especially as Walzer  has drafted this  exemption with a state-centred
mindset,  thereby excluding non-state  war actors,  who are often just  as  relevant  as state  actors
(Walzer 2006: 251-255, Coady 2004: 783). A rather controversial notion, supreme emergency has
been criticized for inconsistency, basic ethical wrongness and a communitarian underpinning that
prioritizes the preservation of certain ways of life over universal human rights (c.f. Bellamy 2004,
Orend 2001). There is one uncontroversial thing, however: that the notion of supreme emergency is
a  fundamentally  consequential  consideration.  In  the  following,  I  will  take  a  hard  look  at  the
consequentialism underpinning traditional in bello considerations.
3.2 Consequentialism in Traditional Ius in Bello
On first thought, war parties' and soldiers' adherence to imperatives like discrimination, necessity,
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and proportionality might seem guided by a deontological perception of morality – ideally, they
display  behaviour  that  is  in  accordance  with  all  of  those  –  ostensibly  –  inherently  righteous
guidelines. In fact, Michael Walzer, arguably the most influential advocate of traditional just war
theory,  has  implied  a  deontological  validity  of  those  principles,  a  notion  often  shared  among
scholars (Walzer 2006: 150f., Bellamy 2004: 831). However, in this chapter, I will argue that this is
a fallacy. What is more, I will closely analyse the deontological pretence these considerations emit,
and subsequently make the case for those principles to be, effectively, derived from a sort of rule-
consequentialism which resembles deontological morality on the surface. In order to alleviate the
philosophical rigour this will  entail,  I  will start off by examining supreme emergency, the only
traditional in bello consideration which is, within the scholarly community, consensually considered
a consequentialist consideration (Bellamy 2004, Statman 2006, Toner 2005).
3.2.1 Supreme Emergency
“The central argument for  SEE [Supreme Emergency Exemption, note] is  straightforwardly an
argument from consequences: if we do not engage in terror-bombing, the consequences will be, as
Walzer put it above, 'immeasurably awful' […]” (Toner 2005: 549)
This is what most theorists agree on. As I have established, the supreme emergency exemption is
based on the notion that in such situations, when all is done, the evils averted greatly outnumber,
quantitatively,  but  especially  qualitatively,  the  evil  caused  by  inflicting  death  on  civilians:
effectively,  this  course of action simply delivers the greatest  amount of good. This is not rule-
consequentialism, as the supreme emergency exemption is not a genuine rule, but, as the name says,
an exemption to the rule of discrimination. It employs a simpler, more straightforward form: act-
consequentialism, the doctrine claiming that an act is morally right only if this act maximizes the
good,  and brings  about  a  greater  amount  of  good than any other  comparable act  (c.f.  Sinnott-
Armstrong 2015). This is what Walzer implies about the act of indiscriminately bombing German
cities in World War Two (up until  1942), thereby undermining his own deontological demands,
which he postulates in the opening pages of Just and Unjust Wars (Walzer 2006: xxii). In fact, some
have argued that the supreme emergency exemption even fails to meet those very consequentialist
demands, as consequentialist morality usually holds that what is right is also mandatory. Walzer,
however, merely argues in favour for the basic legitimacy of supreme emergency, and does not
condone  it  as  mandatory  (Statman  2006:  60).  However,  this  does  not  mean  that  the  supreme
emergency exemption is not built on consequentialist moral ground, but rather that it is a notion
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that, while certainly relying on a teleological consideration of achieving more good than doing evil,
is not able to satisfy the requirements of either deontological or consequentialist ethics in total, and
therefore resides on an utterly shaky moral foundation. Hence, the fact that plenty of philosophers
have argued for its abolishment can hardly surprise (Bellamy 2004, Coady 2004).
3.2.2 The Conditions for Permissible Killing
After dwelling on ipso facto consensual approaches to the consequentialism inherent in the supreme
emergency exemption, I now turn to the permissible killing in bello, and the rule-consequentialism
that the principles guiding it employ. Most theorists have regarded those principles as deontological,
especially the imperative of discrimination (c.f. Nagel 1972, Walzer 2006). Thomas Nagel (1972:
127), arguing in the context of the then ongoing Vietnam War, claims that civilians have too often
been  the  target  of  violence  justified  by  the  gains  made  by  this  strategy,  and  condemns  this
consequentialist justification as utterly impermissible. He subsequently argues for a deontological
absoluteness of a discrimination principle, emphasizing that 
“[…] certain acts cannot be justified no matter what the consequences. Among those acts is murder
– the deliberate killing of the harmless: civilians, prisoners of war, and medical personnel.” (ibid)
Certainly,  this  is  a  claim  that  most  people  could  agree  on;  killing  harmless  people,  innocent
bystanders, is certainly morally impermissible. However, this statement does not capture the whole
truth. It has been interposed that the traditional definition of who can actually be considered a non-
combatant is  not  connected with a strictly absolutist, deontological classification of morality, but
based on the principle of self-defence; thereby rendering everyone who does not, in war, pose an
immediate  physical  threat  to  a  fellow human being as not  liable  to  be killed and therefore,  ex
hypothesi,  a non-combatant (Mavrodes 1975: 123). This does, of course, make plenty of practical
sense. Still, I argue, there are a great deal of situations where those liable to be killed, soldiers, bear
much  less  responsibility  for  possible  wrongdoings  than  some  non-combatants,  who,  however,
supposedly enjoy moral protection from harm.
Imagine a French soldier forced by his government to defend his country against the Nazis in World
War Two. He does not desire any violence or harm; he has been made to fight for the just cause of
self-defence  against  unwarranted  aggression.  On  the  other  hand,  imagine  a  German  industrial
magnate producing deadly weapons used by the Nazis against said Frenchman, purely out of desire
for personal economic gain, with no concern for the unjust suffering he helps to bring about. While
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the French soldier is, in traditional in bello view, liable to be killed, the industrial magnate is not, as
he is a non-combatant who does not pose an immediate physical threat to anyone. Surely, given
these  prerequisites,  most  people  would  agree  that  the  industrialist  is  burdened  with  a  greater
responsibility of inflicting suffering than the soldier, and is therefore,  ceteris paribus, profoundly
guiltier than the soldier. This is explicitly not to criticize the traditional requirements of ius in bello.
However, it goes to show that a principle of discrimination that allows for cases like the above can
never be argued to derive from genuine deontological ethics. Deontology is, among other things
outlined in section 2.1,  concerned with the idea that humans have a duty to  never  treat fellow
persons  as  means,  but  ends  in  themselves  (Kamm  2000:  206).  However,  the  principle  of
discrimination  can  include  cases,  as  the  one  shown  above,  that  clearly  make  sense  from  a
perspective of bringing about clarity, stability and limitation to matters of warfare, but in that sense
alone. It thus follows that the principle of discrimination sometimes fails to account for immediate,
deontological rights and duties in order to keep up the overall structure of clarity and limitation in
war. For instance, ascribing the French soldier introduced above a liability to be killed is certainly
not  advocated  by a  genuinely  deontological  consideration,  since  a  moral  perspective  based  on
immediate vices and virtues of this soldier's acts would clear him of any wrongdoing bringing about
that liability7; rather, the French soldier's unfortunate moral status is a necessity to be endured if the
aim of  in  bello considerations  is  to  keep  war  limited  and  its  rules  easy  to  understand  for  all
participants. Therefore, the French soldier is used as a means to a supposedly greater end. 
This rejection of strict deontology is also, in a similar way, inherent in the  in bello principles of
proportionality and necessity.
Necessity, as we established, is concerned with using the least harmful means that can achieve a
certain aim: a necessary attack in war is an attack which uses means that achieve the objective, but
cause only so much damage as is absolutely necessary (McMahan 2016: 21). Now, this seems like a
genuinely deontological guideline. However, let us employ the example of the French soldier once
again. Drawing on Jeff McMahans (2006, 2009) argument against the equality of combatants, one
may legitimately argue that an attack executed by a German soldier against our Frenchman cannot
possibly be necessary, since the Frenchman simply does not lose his right to life and liberty, as he
fights for a just cause (c.f. McMahan 2006: 379f.). This would be McMahans argument; here, I do
7 Some short notes to support this point: Firstly, this example presupposes that the soldier is forced to fight, with no 
imaginable way out. Secondly, the soldier defends both his life and the endurance of his political community from 
an unwarranted attack which is perpetrated for morally unacceptable reasons. In this case, the CI, for example, 
would clearly rid the Frenchman of any wrongdoing, since his act does not transgress against any duty the universal 
application of which would be desirable from pure reason. While Kant does, of course, condemn killing on the basis 
of the CI, he allows killing in self-defence with no other intend of inflicting harm (see for example Finnis 1983: 131 
ff.). So while traditional in bello theory considers the French soldier liable qua being a soldier, Kant would not agree
to the automatic forfeiting of his right to life in this particular situation.
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not condone (nor condemn) it, since the aim of this paper is not to normatively judge which side of
the  debates  in  just  war  theory is  right.  Still,  I  do  retain  that  said  necessity  of  an  attack  by a
perpetrator of unwarranted aggression against our innocent Frenchman can never be given  from
deontological perspective.  For example, Kant would remind the German soldier to only conduct
actions which he can, from pure reason alone, wish to become a universal maxim;  a fortiori, he
would ultimately condemn any attack on our Frenchman.
The same applies,  mutatis mutandis,  to the principle of proportionality. According to deontology,
acts that are per se wrong could never be proportionate. McMahan implies the obviousness of the
non-deontology of proportionality in the following:
“The explanation of  how traditional  just  war  theory can  consistently claim that  a  war  that  is
disproportionate can consist entirely of acts that are proportionate is that the theory presupposes
that the good effects that can offset the harms caused to innocent civilians by individual acts of war
are neither just-cause goods or non-just-cause goods as ordinarily understood. Indeed, there is,
according to the theory, only one good effect that weighs against the harms inflicted by any act of
war in determining whether that act is proportionate: military advantage.” (McMahan 2016: 8).
While discussing another issue as this paper, this short segment supplies everything this paragraph
wants to say about proportionality in bello: harms caused to innocent civilians can be offset by the
good effects of military advantage. In this case, it is not relevant if the non-combatants targeted are
actually innocent,  since the principle  theoretically applies  to  innocent  civilians as  well  as non-
innocent  civilians.  Such a  notion  can  never  be  deemed deontological;  it  ultimately judges  acts
exclusively in relation to their foreseen or actual consequences.
The  sort  of  ethics  employed  in  the  in  bello  principles  are,  a  fortiori,  of  a  consequentialist
underpinning; they consistently rely on various sorts of good consequences in order to justify some
shortcomings  they  possess.  However,  since  the  moral  guidelines  for  just  warfare  are  coded  as
imperatives which have to, theoretically, be adhered to unconditionally, one cannot categorize them,
for example, as act-consequentialist; the rule of discrimination cannot be stalled simply because its
temporary suspension would in one particular case “maximize human welfare” (Frey 2000: 165).
On the contrary, those rules are absolute, and thus strikingly similar to deontological imperatives.
Be that as it may, it has been established by now that they are not – instead, they stem from rule-
consequentialist considerations. To reiterate,
“Rule-consequentialists believe that the rightness of an act depends not on its own consequences,
but rather on the consequences of a code of rules”. (Hooker 2000: 183)
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The code of rules employed in  in bello ethics is not absolute because of its inherent merits and
deontological permissibility, but because it is the aggregation of those imperatives believed to bring
about the most goodness in warfare, if rigorously adhered to. This is why, for instance, traditional in
bello theory and international law have to endure such fates as the one facing the hypothetical
French  soldier.  The  principle  of  non-combatant-immunity may not  account  for  such individual
cruelties, but it  does, in their view, entail the best consequences by establishing the connection
between direct physical threats and liability to harm, and thus  limiting  the cases of permissible
killings in war. By employing notions of innocence and guilt in establishing who may be liable to
attack,  plenty of scholars have implicitly and explicitly argued,  morality and law would fail  in
clearly limiting  the  cases  of  permissible  killing  in  war;  if  one  would  include  the  hypothetical
German industrialist, for example, the palpable threshold between permissible and impermissible
killings  in  war  would  vanish  (compare  Johnson 2000).  Thus,  declaring  non-combatants  as  not
necessarily innocents, but those not posing immediate physical threats, the traditional interpretation
of the discrimination principle is established as a gateway to ensuring accountability, stability and
clarity  regarding  questions  of  permissible  killing  in  war.  Or,  to  put  it  differently:  It  is  a  rule
established because it foreseeably entails the most valuable consequences among all alternatives.
Therefore, deliberately killing civilians in war in traditional view is not wrong in itself, but it is
wrong because  it  displays  behaviour  not  in  accordance  with  the  rule  bringing  about  the  most
goodness.
Similarly, the traditional design of the requirements of proportionality and necessity entails that one
has to act in accordance to them because they are the most sensible rules conceivable, in the sense
that adherence to them produces the consequences of the most value overall. For instance, it could
be argued that an act of violence towards the Frenchman in our thought experiment can never be
necessary nor proportional, since every attack on him would hinder him from achieving his just
cause,  and  would  likely  arise  out  of  unjust  aggression  (McMahan  2016:  17-23).  However,
traditional ius in bello does not share this view. As Hurka (2005: 38) clarifies, 
“[…] the various proportionality conditions […] all say a war or act of war is wrong if the relevant
harm it will cause is out of proportion to its relevant good.” 
As ius in bello and ius ad bellum are, in traditional view, entirely separate entities, there is no moral
difference between just and unjust combatants; the proportionality criterion merely aims to carefully
ponder the harms and goods achieved by a certain military action, and obligates combatants to
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prefer the action bringing about the most possible overall good. While this is a consequentialist
condition in itself, let's once again illuminate why regular attacks on our French soldier satisfy the
traditional conception of proportionality (and thus of necessity). As shown, it has been argued that
war  acts  perpetrated  by  soldiers  fighting  for  an  unjust  cause  can  never  be  proportionate  or
necessary. However, embracing this view would break up of the notion that ius in bello and ius ad
bellum are separate and thus may endanger the central maxims of limitation, stability and clarity in
warfare: accepting the inherent inadmissibility of unjust soldiers attacking just soldiers, as a strictly
deontological theory surely would, might lead to a formidable decrease in clarity, limitation and
stability in war; it would break up the notion that ius in bello and ius ad bellum are separate. The
overall harms may outweigh the overall goods; war might cease to be limited and clear. This is why
combatants fighting for unjust causes are treated equally to those fighting for just causes, and why a
Nazi attack on our French soldier can hence be necessary and proportional. General adherence to
the traditional interpretation of necessity and proportionality is thus considered imperative, as it is
postulated to be the rule entailing the best consequences of all alternatives at hand. 
In this section, I have shown how the  in bello conditions for permissible killing, discrimination,
necessity, and proportionality, derive their general validity from a rule-consequentialist paradigm
that  obligates  universal  adherence  to  those  imperatives  because they are seen  as  the principles
entailing the best possible consequences. In the following, I will attend to a revisionist view on ius
in bello  which comes to gravely different conclusions, a just war theory rooted in cosmopolitan
perceptions of morality and justice. 
3.3 Cosmopolitan Ius in Bello and its Account of Permissible Killing
Part of the broad revisionist movement in just war theory, Cecile Fabre has supplied the first book-
length cosmopolitan war theory; that is, a re-evaluation of both the central ad bellum and in bello
principles from this perspective (Fabre 2012: 3). The cosmopolitanism she alludes to is the one
specified in section 2.2. In the following two chapters, I will take a close look at the requirements
and  principles  this  theory  sets  for  in  bello killing,  both  regarding  the  innocent  and  the  non-
innocent8. This procedure deviates from the traditional in bello analysis for the simple reason that
both  the  requirement  of  non-combatant  immunity  and  the  principle  of  the  moral  equality  of
combatants connected with it are interpreted and formulated in a different way in the cosmopolitan
8 Meaning those who are not morally guilty by any measure, and, respectively, those who are morally guilt by some 
measure.
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war theory (compare Fabre 2012: 90-95, 118-125, 157f.). As the liabilities of different groups of
moral agents shift, so does the salience of traditional core principles such as proportionality and
necessity;  therefore,  this  section  will  focus  on  the  distinction  and  basic  difference  in  liability
between the innocent and the non-innocent. I will start by illuminating the cosmopolitan theory's
perspective on the permissibility of killing the innocent in war.
3.3.1 Determining Liability: The Separation of the Innocent and the Non-Innocent
“[In subsistence wars, note]9 the difficulty is that the rights violations which provide the very poor
with a just cause for war are carried out by civilians. […] citizens and public officials are under a
duty of justice to (respectively) support and implement just institutions, laws, and policies, as well
as duties not to take part in structured and organized practices the effects of which are severely
harmful to others. The question, then, is whether those rights violations are such as to provide the
very deprived with a justification for killing those individuals as a matter of rights.” (Fabre 2012:
118f.)
While this paragraph entails deliberations specifically applicable to subsistence wars10, – Fabre's
cosmopolitanism leads her to analyse different types of war separately, as some involve different
moral intricacies as others – it is immediately apparent that she reconsiders the conditions relevant
for individual liability to attack, and arrives at different conclusions as the traditional in bello theory
(Fabre  2012:  5f.).  In  fact,  this  is  one  of  the  gravest  alterations  her  theory  introduces,  as  her
introduction reads: “[…] some non-combatants are also liable to being killed – those who in fact do
take part, in relevant ways to be described later, in an unjust war.”  (Fabre 2012: 6). This notion
breaks with traditional derivations of the discrimination principle and challenges the traditional
absoluteness of non-combatant immunity. However, all this does not yet pertain to the  innocent.
Those who are truly innocent  – that  means,  not  engaged in any significant  wrongdoing in  the
context of warfare – can, of course, in no theory of the just war become liable to be killed, no less
in  this  one  (Fabre  2012:  68ff.,  119f.,  242f.).  Inevitably,  some  threshold  or  criteria  for  the
classification of innocents and non-innocents has to be set, in order to introduce a comprehensible
account of liability. This cannot be an easy enterprise; latent and ambivalent notions of guilt and
9 Subsistence wars are wars fought as (pre-emptive) defence against “violence of subsistence rights […] the material 
resources we need to lead a minimally decent life)” (Fabre 2014: 8)  [for example: water or basic agricultural 
products, note]. It may generally be controversial if a right to such basic goods does in fact exist, but the 
cosmopolitan human right to a minimally decent life implies an entitlement to minimally satisfying subsistence.
10 Please note that every conclusion I draw from different chapters of Fabre's book pertaining to different kinds of wars
is applicable to every sort of war. While some aspects might be specifically true for one kind of war only, the general
inference deduced from them is universally applicable (for instance, see the part about patriotic partiality in 
particular and the predication about the importance of rights in general in section 3.3.2).
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responsibility have to be generalized in order to build a classification.
Fabre (2012: 120) proposes that the harm non-combatants cause has to be severe and their actions
must  possess  a  strong  and  direct  nexus  to  the  deprivation  of  those  affected,  in  order  for  the
wrongdoer's basic right to life to be forfeited; deprivation caused by individual's support for unjust
institutions (biased trade deals, for instance), for example, is morally condemnable and transgresses
cosmopolitan ideals, but cannot lead to the forfeiture of basic rights of civilians. That being said,
“one cannot rule out, on principle, that the possibility that civilians whose individual contributions
or  omissions  have  a  significant  connection  with  the  harms  suffered  by  distant  strangers  are
legitimate targets.” (Fabre 2012: 124). She specifies this point elsewhere:
“[…] whether or not those agents [those taking part in or supporting unjust practices and policies,
note] are liable to being targeted depends on whether their contributions to those practices and
policies  themselves  constitute a  wrongful  harm when taken  on their  own,  or  are significantly
causally related to the resultant human rights violations.” (Fabre 2012: 158)
In any case, civilians liable to attack, according to this theory, have one feature in common: they
contribute to the furthering of unjust causes or their actions hinder just combatants to achieve their
legitimate  aims;  in  attacking  civilians,  one  “should  be  guided  by the  criterion  of  contributory
responsibility for a wrongful threat” and take into account “the degree to which the attack will
succeed in forestalling that evil” (Fabre 2012: 287).11 Before turning to a lengthier analysis of what
may actually be done in which way to those deemed liable by this line of thought, it is definitely
adequate to give room for one major objection to this view on liability: the threshold set seems both
practically  arbitrary  and  rather  low.  The  relevant  causal  nexus  to  omitted  harm,  which  she
introduces  as  a  central  liability requirement,  is  both  practically  unmeasurable  and blind  to  the
possibility of  intention constituting a category for the measurement of unethical behaviour (c.f.
Lazar 2013: 411f.).
Still, all this implies a grave negation of traditional just war theory's core paradigm: the separation
of  ius in bello and  ius ad bellum.  The in bello permission to kill almost exclusively depends,  ex
post, on the ad bellum permission to fight for one's cause; in the following, I will illuminate how,
then, a cosmopolitan conception of the just war accounts for the scope, requirements and ways of
permissibly killing the hostile non-innocent.
11 One can also find this underlying paradigm in her partial defence of the use of human shields (Fabre 2012: 256-
268).
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3.3.2 Killing the Hostile  12   Non-Innocent and Collateral Damage
Thus far, I have concluded that Fabre's theory of the cosmopolitan war weakens the discrimination
requirement because it allows for the killing of both combatants and some gravely responsible non-
combatants in bello. As I have further claimed, the origin of this approach lies in the abandonment
of the traditional separation between ad bellum and in bello. However, this also means that not all
combatants can be legitimate targets in war. Her argument in this respect largely resembles the
argument other revisionist theorists, especially Jeff McMahan, have brought forward against the
moral equality of combatants13. In a nutshell:
“[…] whether combatants may – indeed, have the right to – kill enemy combatants (in large part)
depends on the moral status of their war ad bellum in general and whether it has a just cause in
particular.” (Fabre 2012: 71)
This conclusion is – again – reached through an analogy to self-defence. In her view, an unjust
attacker A does not have the right to forcefully protect himself from the retaliation the self-defence
of  the  unjustfully attacked defender  D inflicts  upon him,  while  defender  D has  every right  to
retaliate against the unjust threat with all means necessary (and proportionately adequate) (Fabre
2012: 69f.)  Hence,  overall,  the scope of permissible killings in war shifts in this  cosmopolitan
perspective: it becomes both wider and tighter, as some combatants are now exempt from suffering
harm and some non-combatants liable to attack, as they are not automatically immune from harm
qua being non-combatants. So far, this chapter has merely analysed questions about the scope of
permissible harm in bello; yet, little has hitherto been said about the shape this harm may adapt, and
it  is yet  to be determined which constraints govern the use of permissible force in which way.
Analogous  to  the  chapters  concerned  with  traditional  in  bello,  I  consider  the  requirements  of
necessity and proportionality in bello, since this allows the different theories to be juxtaposed in an
enlightening way. Necessity, firstly, is neither abandoned nor significantly changed: “necessity […]
12 The reference to hostile, meaning those of the adversarial war party, is important because Fabre, in quite the 
cosmopolitan fashion, also refers to possibilities of exposing civilians belonging to one's own party to lethal harm 
(Fabre 2012: 242-268). However, this paper is concerned with the confrontation of traditional views on killing 
enemies in war with the cosmopolitan perspective on this matter, which is why considerations on the liability of 
'one's own' cannot be discussed here.
13 The argument against the moral equality of combatants has indeed been made well before Fabre's book, especially 
by Jeff McMahan (2009), and is, by now, well established. One might interject the question of why I don't simply 
analyse this broadly revisionist position, as it seems to make the same case for liability as Fabre's cosmopolitan 
notion. However, it does not. It cannot support the idea of civilian's liability to attack, since it locates the basis for 
liability in moral responsibility for a wrongful threat alone, while Fabre locates it in a broader contributory 
responsibility for wrongdoings, which is the actual novelty of her approach (Fabre 2012: 72, Footnote 21.)
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remain[s] the same whether or not one believes that justice is global rather than national in scope”,
which is why it is not a requirement in need of adjustment (Fabre 2012: 5). However, one might
easily miss  the one alteration that  the necessity criterion is  subject  to.  Necessity is,  of  course,
always coupled with liability. As belligerents adhere to necessity, thus choosing the least harmful
option available to reach their  aim, their  chosen act may be executed within the constraints  of
liability only. Therefore, only agents liable to be attacked can ever portray a satisfying object of the
belligerents' proposed act, which has to be subjected to necessity considerations. Hence, as liability
has shifted from merely pertaining to all combatants to exclude some soldiers and include some
non-combatants, necessity has to adapt: from the cosmopolitan perspective, an unjust soldier can
never claim necessity in attacking a just soldier. Not the requirement as such changes, but the scope
of its application (this whole line of thought is not explicitly spelled out, but compare Fabre 2012:
72).
Prima  facie,  since  necessity  and  proportionality  are  intertwined  criteria,  –  there  is  no
proportionality without necessity, and a necessary act still has to be deemed proportionate – one
could assume that the same steadiness in principle but shift in scope applies to proportionality.  A
fitting example of the shift in scope is the harm done to (in some form) liable civilians. Confronted
with  the  idea  that  non-innocent  civilians  may inflict  wrongs  upon  moral  agents  which  are  in
themselves morally condemnable, but not as grave that the perpetrators would lose their right to
life, Fabre asserts: 
“That said, the fact that agents who are not liable to being killed in the sense just defined but
nevertheless unjustifiably contribute to the imposition of a wrongdoing provides their victims, or
agents acting on their behalf, with a justification for deliberately imposing a lesser harm (than the
loss of their life) on them collectively.” (Fabre 2012: 77)
While this contemplation initially reads like a justification for punitive harm, which is outlawed by
just war theory in general, it is in fact formulated in the context of the infliction of (pre-emptive or
imminent)  self-defensive  harm (compare  Fabre  2012:  75ff.).  As  I  have  analysed  before,  those
notions all take the applicability of a necessity principle as  prima facie  justified. Certainly, then,
this line of thought also adopts the proportionality principle; it is thoroughly implied here, since the
infliction  of  some degree  of  harm below the  death-threshold  is  a  deliberation  not  conceivable
without proportionality as a central concern. The question of how much harm is to be inflicted as
defence from a certain level of aggression touches the very fibre of proportionality. In fact, unjust
attackers who are being retaliated against with unjust means or no consideration for necessity or
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proportionality regain their  right  to attack the initially just  defenders (Fabre 2012:  78)14.  Thus,
proportionality as the actuality of an adequate relation between the gravity of the suffered attack
and the scope of defensive retaliation remains a central principle of designing war acts. 
However, proportionality is explicitly addressed as one of the requirements in need of revision:
“[…] goods and bads other than lives saved or destroyed must be included in the proportionality
calculus, whether in its ad bellum or its in bello variants.” (Fabre 2012: 6). While proportionality as
a criterion certainly has to be adjusted to apply to those cases covered by the liability criteria, it also
becomes relevant in one further way. In the cosmopolitan theory of the just war, the string of the
proportionality principle governing the extent of permissible harm endured by innocent bystanders
as collateral damage is newly adjusted. The goods and bads other than lives saved or destroyed are
located  mainly  in  rights,  Fabre  claims.  Thus,  albeit  counter-intuitive,  from  a  cosmopolitan
perspective,  jointly held rights, for instance, may give reason to patriotic partiality in war. Those
rights and their perseverance have to prevail as a valid good, and, in consequence, their violation as
a valid vice (Fabre 2012: 82-92). Importantly, not the fact that a cosmopolitan theory of war may
allow for patriotic partiality is essential, but the justification via rights. This fits into a cosmopolitan
paradigm which seems to set  an especially high standard of irredeemable individual rights and
group  rights  deviated  from them.  The  proportionality  condition,  thus,  is  amplified  to  include
considerations about the defence of rights, whereas it merely includes lives, deaths and utility in
war in orthodox in bello theory (c.f. Lazar 2013: 409f.). As Lazar (Ibid) observes:
“Fabre argues that  insofar as co-citizens are defending joint  rights to political  sovereignty and
territorial integrity, they can appeal to the agent-centred prerogatives that would justify their co-
citizens in killing innocent by-standers as a side effect. […] So when our armed forces defend our
joint rights to sovereignty and territorial integrity, what they are really defending is individually
held rights to the conditions for a minimally decent life.”
This  is  a  novel  consideration  which  has  not  been  included  in  the  traditional  proportionality
condition.  As a  comparison,  it  is  fruitful  to  juxtapose this  against  the  proportionality condition
employed  by  (customary)  international  humanitarian  law,  which  equals  traditionalist  in  bello
deliberations: 
“Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians,  damage  to  civilian  objects,  or  a  combination  thereof,  which  would  be  excessive  in
14 Again, while my portrayal of the positions brought forward in Fabres book make them look like mere claims, they 
are argued for at length, which, for reasons of space and clarity, I cannot adequately transfer to this paper. To 
reconstruct the full composition of this argument, see Fabre 2012: 71-81.
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relation to the concrete and direct  military advantage anticipated, is prohibited.”  (International
Committee of the Red Cross 2016: Rule 14)
While  the  cosmopolitan  understanding  of  proportionality  includes  rights  as  a  justification  for
collateral damage, the traditional understanding is restricted to military advantage. 
All  in all,  the cosmopolitan paradigm differs from the traditionalist  paradigm in two important
aspects respective to in bello permissible killing. First, the principle of discrimination is readjusted,
as  liability  shifts  from  those  representing  a  direct  physical  threat  to  those  with  a  sufficient
contributory  responsibility  for  severe  wrongdoing.  Therefore,  some soldiers  become  non-liable
while  some civilians  become liable.  Subsequently,  the scope of liability changes;  necessity and
proportionality have to adapt to the new scope. Furthermore, proportionality ceases to be restricted
to a mere weighing of lives: jointly held individual rights have to be included in the equation. This
may lead to a different justification of collateral damage (Fabre 2012: 6, 81-95, 120-124, 284). In
the  next  section,  I  will  show the  Kantianism inherent  in  this  line  of  thought.  I  will  do  so  by
employing an approach analogous to section 3.2.2.
3.4 Kantianism in Cosmopolitan Ius in Bello
As I aim to depict the Kantian ethics underpinning the cosmopolitan view on  ius in bello,  I will
begin  by  showing  why  the  latter  is  not  compatible  with  consequentialist  considerations.
Subsequently, adopting the same example as in section 3.2.2, I aim to clarify why, contrariwise, the
shape and scope of the cosmopolitan in bello principles are of a Kantian deontology. 
“I agree with deontologists, of whom I am, that pace consequentialists, some acts are intrinsically
right or, as the case may be, intrinsically wrong, irrespective of their consequences. […] However,
I also take on board the quasi-consequentialist point that consequences sometimes do matter a
great  deal.  The resulting theory might  seem an  ad hoc,  unhappy hybrid  of  deontological  and
consequentialist intuitions.” (Fabre 2012: 13)
The aim of this section, to put it differently, is to illuminate this statement by Fabre; to show why
one may still call her theory Kantian although she herself admits to incorporating consequentialist
considerations. Let me start with the scope and shape of liability to harm.
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3.4.1 Two Examples and Their Implications
As  I  have  shown  before,  both  the  scope  and  the  shape  of  this  liability  is  developed  in  the
cosmopolitan theory of in bello conduct to ultimately differ quite gravely from the traditional view.
While morally innocent non-combatants stay protected from deliberately inflicted physical harm,
non-innocent civilians may be subjected to such impairment. On the other hand, innocent soldiers,
i.e. those fighting for a profoundly just cause employing just means, are, too, protected, while non-
innocent soldiers, i.e. those fighting for an unjust cause or with unjust means, are liable to harm
(Fabre 2012: 71f., 119f.). Let me illuminate how this may be applied in actual warfare. Again, one
can consider the same example of the hypothetical French soldier in World War II as before. While I
have  already set  the  stipulation  that  he  is  fighting  for  a  just  cause  with  just  means,  one  can
furthermore prima facie assume that his counterpart, the German soldier, is fighting for an unjust
cause (although not necessarily with unjust means). In this scenario, Fabre's cosmopolitan theory
would rid the Frenchman of any liability to harm, as he is clearly acting justly,  defending both
himself and the collective rights his polity guarantees against unwarranted aggression. The German
soldier,  meanwhile,  is  liable  to  every  sort  of  harm  necessary  and  proportionate  to  parry  his
unsolicited attack.
Now, let me refine this example. Let us assume that the Frenchman and his regiment of men with
exactly the same properties as him face a decision: In order to stop a conglomerate of Nazi troops
from capturing a town, their only available option is to demolish a bridge which at that time may or
may not be frequented by innocent German civilians; the French regiment has no way of knowing
for sure, although it generally is a busy bridge. The catch is the following: This regiment of Nazis is
a very benevolent outlier, and they would not kill the inhabitants. Furthermore, the town is not
strategically relevant to the overall invasion of French. The Nazis would, however, inhabit the town
and create their own institutions, laws and norms pertaining to that town; the original population
would be degraded to second-class citizens. Let me further assume that the number of moral agents
affected by the Nazis'  seizing of the town is  lower than the number of casualties  produced by
demolishing the bridge. In this case, pace traditional just war theory, Fabre's cosmopolitan theory of
war would allow the demolishing of the bridge, even if innocent civilians were to unintentionally be
killed, on the ground that jointly held rights of the French citizens would be transgressed against;
“jointly held rights to political self-determination and territorial integrity” are so important as to
justify  the  killing  of  innocent  as  collateral  damage,  even  though  neither  a  life  nor  a  military
advantage is at stake (Fabre 2012: 96, 93f.). This conclusion fits into the notion that a cosmopolitan
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just war theory assigns more value to a greater range of rights than the traditional view on in bello
conduct.
Again, this contrast in action between the traditional and cosmopolitan just war theory is largely due
to their different grounding in normative ethics. I will thus demonstrate the non-consequentialism of
the  line  of  thought  employed  in  both  examples.  To  paraphrase,  various  forms  of  (act-)
consequentialism are built upon the premise that only those acts are favourable whose consequences
maximize the good and are thereby of high value, while rule-consequentialism holds that all acts are
to be in adherence with those rules which produce the greatest value (Frey 2000: 165, Hooker 200:
181ff.). One might argue that neither of the courses of action described in the examples are likely to
produce consequences of the highest value. In every case, however, it is certainly clear that neither
notion would have been embraced by a consequentialist mindset. Let me start with the first case: the
non-liability of the French soldier. In the following, I will show that Fabre's notion of combatant
liability is not consequentialist,  but Kantian.  I will then include her principle of non-combatant
liability in the same argument.
3.4.2 Liability
As I have established in section 3.2.2., the reason for strict non-combatant immunity and the moral
equality of soldiers  in bello is a rule-consequentialist paradigm which sets rules according to the
value they produce. In Fabre's theory, both strict non-combatant immunity and the moral equality of
soldiers  are  negated  for  reasons  of  individual  accountability  (e.g.  Fabre  2012:  71f.,  119f.).
Therefore,  these  cosmopolitan  conclusions  do not  fit  within  the  traditional  rules  set  with  rule-
consequentialist  considerations  in  mind.  Hence,  they  cannot  contain  rule-consequentialist
properties, since there cannot be two legitimate rules containing contradictory propositions. What is
more, Fabre's notions on combatant liability can also not be interpreted as act-consequentialist (or,
for that matter, any other form of consequentialism concerned with actions)15. On the surface, it
might  certainly  seem  like  the  non-liability  of  the  French  soldier  and  the  German  soldier's
inadmissibility to defend himself against the righteous acts of the French combatant bring about the
consequences  of  the  greatest  (or  satisficingly  great)  value.  On  an  agent-related  notion  on
consequentialism, this might be true for the French, but not for the German soldier, because their
priorities differ and the German assumably wants to protect his life16. On an agent-neutral notion of
15 Another form of consequentialism, motive-consequentialism, is principally inapplicable to this topic because it 
concerns issues of intention for acts, which is in this form not relevant for either the traditional nor the cosmopolitan
view on just war (Adams 1976: 467f.).
16 There is debate about whether there is such a thing as agent-relative consequentialism. See Portmore: 2001,  
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consequentialism, however, it might be true for the German, but not for the French soldier, because
there might be an option bringing about more value than shooting the German soldier (c.f. Portmore
2001:  375ff.,  McNaughton,  Rawling  1991:  167-185).  This  already  signals  great  trouble  for  a
consequentialist explanation of Fabre's theory of liability.
Be  that  as  it  may,  there  is  an  even  more  powerful  argument  doubting  the  behaviour  in  bello
proposed  by Fabre's  theory  (the  acts  of  the  French  and  the  German  soldier  in  this  particular
example) is conducted by consequentialist considerations. This is the fact that the way liability is
constructed  in  her  argument  does  simply  not  account  for  an  assessment  by  consequences.
Combatant liability, as illuminated by the example employing the French and the German soldier,
is, in the cosmopolitan theory, rooted in the cause each combatant is fighting for; every combatant
thus has to carry the burden of individually deciding if the reason he fights for is a just concern.
This, in turn, means that there is some norm, some independent value that governs the righteousness
of his act. The act of fighting per se, thus, is a function of upholding a certain property. Hence, it is
oriented not toward any future end, but toward an indispensable value which is guiding action. This
is the bottom line of  deontological ethics, and stands in plain contrast to  teleology  (Hurley 2013:
1275f.).
Thus, the reason that our French soldier is allowed to forcefully defend himself against the German
soldier,  who,  ceteris  paribus,  is  not  permitted  to  retaliate  in  his  favour,  is  of  a  deontological
consideration:  the  German  transgresses  prima  facie duties  by  defending  himself,  whilst  the
Frenchman does not. Now that it is asserted that Fabre's theory on combatant liability, illustrated by
the first example, is in fact rooted in deontological ethics, I have yet to determine the Kantianism of
this account. I will do so by looking to locate all the constituent parts of Kantianism introduced in
section 2.117. Since it is already settled that Fabre's deliberations prescribe moral worth to actions
per se, I merely have to examine if her theory of just action and combatant liability is in accordance
with  the  CI  and  if  it  is  built  on  the  principle  of  assigning  fundamental  rights  and  duties  to
individuals in a universal fashion, i.e. without being restricted by artificial boundaries. Firstly, let
me examine adherence to the CI as formulated in 2.118. To start with, it is safe to determine that the
actions Fabre would demand of both the French and the German soldier in this particular situation
do accord with  some maxim. This is the maxim that only those acts of war are justified which
follow the attainment of a just cause and are necessary and proportionate; this does not only pertain
McNaughton, Rawling 1991.
17 To shortly reiterate, these are 1) adherence to the CI, which demands 2) acceptance of the centrality of fundamental 
rights and duties ascribed to every individual moral agent, 3) the prescription of moral worth to actions per se, and 
not their consequences, and has to be regarded as 4) universally valid, without respect to borders.
18 “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law 
[without contradiction, note].” (Kant, Wood & Schneewind 2002: 37)
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to the leadership of the war parties,  but every individual taking part  in hostilities (Fabre 2012:
71ff.).  The decisive question is whether this maxim can be boundlessly advocated to become a
universal law. Let me analyse that question by means of working through a catalogue that allows
examination of a certain maxim in regards to the CI by Johnson and Cureton (2016):
“First, formulate a maxim that enshrines your reason for acting as you propose. Second, recast that
maxim as a universal law of nature governing all rational agents, and so as holding that all must,
by natural law, act as you yourself propose to act in these circumstances. Third, consider whether
your maxim is even conceivable in a world governed by this law of nature. If it is, then, fourth, ask
yourself whether you would, or could, rationally will to act on your maxim in such a world. If you
could, then your action is morally permissible.”
To clarify, the maxim examined according to those steps is the principle that the permissibility of
inflicting  harm  in  bello  and,  in  turn,  the  status  of  individual  liability,  depends  on  the  moral
properties of the cause one is fighting for. Since the first two criteria set by Johnson and Cureton are
already processed by default, I can directly turn to stipulation three. In a world governed by this law
of moral liability, it stands to reason that no one would fight for an unjust cause, thus eliminating
warfare  entirely,  since  fighting  for  a  just  cause  can  always  merely  be  the  repudiation  of  the
infliction of unjust harm. At the very least, however, it would ensure that those fighting for unjust
causes of aggression would be morally condemned. There is no contradiction by the maxim and its
implications. The maxim at hand is thus conceivable in a world governed by it as a natural law.
What is more, I have already implied the maxim's accordance to obligation four. It seems that one
should rationally act on this maxim when implemented as a law of nature, since it is in accordance
with  prima facie  rights and duties. Inflicting harm in war only if fighting for a just cause surely
accords with the furthering of rights and duties pertaining to life and liberty, since it treats those
prima  facie norms  as  the  founding  properties  for  action.  I  have  thus  established  that  Fabre's
cosmopolitan notion of combatant liability is in concord with Kant's CI. 
Furthermore, her notion also conforms to the principle that the acceptance of prima facie individual
rights and duties are central to Kantian ethics. As I have just shown, the prominence of those rights
and duties are furthered by strict  adherence to her concept of combatant liability.  Also, Fabre's
theory explicitly ascribes all moral agents “rights to the resources and freedoms which they need in
order to lead a minimally decent life.” (Fabre 2012: 7). Moreover, those rights are outspokenly
universal: “[...] political borders are arbitrary from a moral point of view, and more precisely ought
not to have a bearing on individuals' prospects for a flourishing life.” (Fabre 2012: 16). This notion
of rights grounds Fabre's concept of combatant liability, which is hence genuinely Kantian from an
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ethical point of view; the reason that the French soldier may legitimately attack the German in self-
defence, but not the other way around, is hence rooted in Kantian considerations.
It is of the utmost importance to note that the Kantianism employed in Fabre's theory of combatant
liability applies to  her notion of non-combatant liability as well.  Firstly,  her consideration that,
principally, non-combatants may sometimes be liable to deliberate harm, cannot be consequentialist
for the same reason that her argument on combatant liability cannot be consequentialist. In both
cases, the point of reference for liability is the immediate righteousness of an act, i.e. the accordance
of an act with prima facie duties. For the same reason, we can analogously conclude that her view
on non-combatant liability is a Kantian conclusion as well; to deny this point would mean to deny
that the prescription of liability to soldiers and to civilians follows the same rules. This notion, in
turn, would have to prescribe different, innate properties to being a soldier and being a civilian; it
would  have  to  postulate  a  distinct  'soldier-ness'  and 'civilian-ness'.  In  Fabre's  theory,  however,
liability of harm is a mere consequence from a certain contributory responsibility for wrongdoing,
in the civilian context as well as in the context of war (Fabre 2012: 72, Footnote 21). There is no
qualitative difference. Therefore, her theories' loosening of non-combatant-immunity is Kantian for
the same reason that her views on combatant liability are.
3.4.3 The Non-Liable as Collateral Damage
Let me now turn to the second example, the unintentional killing of non-liable enemy civilians in
order to retain fundamentally important jointly held rights19. This is arguably trickier than the first
example,  since  it  is  not  about  the  justification  of  liability,  but  the  overruling  of  non-liability.
Condoning the killing of innocents in order to preserve fundamental rights sure appears like an
agent-relative consequentialist consideration: the preservation of rights outweighs the evils done by
killing the innocent. However, it is not that clear. 
Again, one can safely assume that this is not a rule-consequentialist consideration, since the fact
that her perception of acceptable collateral damage in this case widens the scope for permissible
casualties, a notion that does not fit with the rule-consequentialist conception that “the rules whose
widespread internalization would maximize utility are what determine whether acts are right or
wrong.” (Hooker 2013: 491). One could hardly formulate a general rule condoning the demolition
of the bridge in my example, since its widespread internalization would arguably not maximize
19 On the surface, one could immediately criticize this notion as inconsequential and illogical, as Fabre's cosmopolitan 
theory regards borders as morally irrelevant. Why, then, should one distinguish between enemy and 'own' civilians? 
Fabre explains this at length. In a nutshell, she argues that the people with whom one shares society and polity are 
reason to grant collective rights as an aggregate of individual rights, since individual rights to build political 
communities resonate in jointly held rights on an aggregate level (Fabre 2012: 42-45, 82-92).
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overall utility (as a desirable consequence) to include fundamental rights on the same qualitative
level as lives. However, this is inconceivable, because consequentialist theories generally target the
attainment of the  good, in the sense of the  pleasurable  as the antecedent of the  right  (Robertson
2010: 440).  A fortiori, while a deontological theory might accept Fabre's primacy of fundamental
rights, since it does not view good and right as independent notions, the rule-consequentialist focus
on the good cannot allow the bombing of the bridge, since the rule condoning it would not lead to
an overall increase in valuable consequences, especially if the bombing infers more casualties than
moral  agents  are  affected  by  the  Nazis'  occupation.  This  argument  also  applies  to  act-
consequentialism,  since  it  shares  the  prominence  of  the  overall  resulting  good  with  rule-
consequentialism; in this way, both varieties of teleology are analogous (c.f. Kagan 1998: 222f.).
Thus, the underlining normative ethics guiding Fabre's permission of the bombing in my example
have to be of a deontological nature. In order to test if said deontology is of Kantian coinage, I can,
again, resort to the criteria set by Johnson and Cureton (2016) (see section 3.4.2). To start with, a
maxim enshrining the act of bombing the bridge in the example has to be formulated. This maxim
may be codified as follows: combatants fighting for a just cause have a justification for inflicting
collateral  damage on innocent non-combatants belonging to the party waging war in pursuit  of
unjust ends, if doing so is the last resort option to retaining the lives or jointly held fundamental
rights20 of themselves or their co-citizens. Now, let me imagine this maxim as a universal law. In a
world governed by this law, analogously to Fabre's argument on combatant liability, the maxim is
still conceivable; there is no apparent contradiction between the results of its application and the
properties it is designed to accomplish. The hard part is the next criterion. Can one rationally want
to act on this proposed universal law? This last criterion touches on prima facie rights and duties.
These are double-edged: on one side, there is the just combatants' (and their co-citizens') obvious
right to life, liberty and defence against unwarranted aggression. On the other side, there is the non-
liable civilians' right to life and liberty. What is more, there is also the just combatants' duty to
protect themselves and their co-citizens from that unwarranted aggression – in a sense, there is a
duty to fight. Nonetheless, is there also a duty to condone the unintentional killing of non-liable
enemy civilians? Hardly. However, Fabre explicitly states:
“It  seems  to  me  that  a  plausible  justification  for  unequal  weighing  lies  in  agents'  personal
prerogative to confer greater weight on their own rights than on the rights of strangers.” (Fabre
2012: 89)21
20 Especially territorial integrity and political sovereignty. 
21 This is also why, in her view, the attacked non-liable civilians would have the moral right to defend themselves.
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She thus endorses the agent-relative ethics of deontology; Kantianism does so as well. Note that the
final  point  of  Kantian  deliberation  on  the  permissibility  of  acts  always  relies  on  a  subjective
assessment as to whether the maxim guiding the proposed act should become a universal law. While
this subjectivity is hard to transcend, and will certainly bring about different conclusion depending
on if one is the just combatant or the non-liable civilian, it seems to me that most rational moral
agents  who are  neither,  and thus  secluded from this  particular  situation,  would  agree  with  the
proposed maxim because of its immediate reinforcement of the importance of inalienable rights.
Despite the instability the application of this maxim might possibly bring about in our world, there
seems  to  be  ample  evidence  for  the  thesis  that  this  principle  would  strengthen  the  role  of
fundamental  prima facie rights and duties in a world in which it has been institutionalized and is
universally  adhered  to.  Therefore,  one  can  justifiably  say  that  the  proposed  maxim heeds  the
premises  of  the  CI.  Furthermore,  this  notion  on  permissible  collateral  damage  is  ex  hypothesi
universal,  meaning  irrespective  of  borders,  and,  through  adherence  to  the  CI,  explicitly  meets
Kantianism's conditions two and three22.
It has thus been shown that Cecile Fabre's cosmopolitan notion on the permissibility of collateral
damage in bello is of a Kantian nature. Revisiting the example, I can now say that the permissibility
of unintentionally harming non-liable civilians by demolishing a bridge as a last resort to saving the
fundamental rights jointly held with one's co-citizens has a Kantian foundation23.  Overall,  thus,
Fabre's  cosmopolitan  principles  of  killing  in  bello are  Kantian.  The  consequentialism  she
acknowledges  herself  (Fabre  2012:  13)  does  hence  not  pertain  to  her  views  on  liability  and
collateral  damage  (rather,  for  example,  it  is  employed  in  her  ad  bellum deliberations  on
humanitarian intervention, see Fabre 2012: 169-178). Finally,  I will henceforth reiterate the key
aspects this paper has disclosed and tend to the overall validity of the original hypothesis.
22 Again, see 2.1.
23 There is one ostensibly powerful argument derailing my whole train of thought: the assertion that collateral damage
can never be condoned by Kantian ethics, since it effectively uses humans as a means to an end. This argument
would claim that, to truly be Kantian, one would have to assess the possibility of unintentionally killing the innocent
separately from any perks this act might bring about, such as the preservation of rights. However, this strikes me as a
philosophical shortcut. Kant certainly does not forbid all killings. In fact, he introduced the concept of a duty of
virtue: “a requirement of reason to adopt certain general ends, values and fundamental attitudes toward persons” and
advocates that “it is a duty to make 'the right of humanity' one's end” (Reath 2013: 460f.). In fact, the unintentional
killing discussed in my example strikes me as a prime instance of an act which is not right by its consequences, but
its virtues: it derives from the duty to further human welfare, as it defends the significance of fundamental rights and
duties. Moreover, Reath (ibid) locates the core of the duties of virtue in the “preservation and development of the
capacity for inner freedom and self-government”. Thus, passing the universality test, Fabre's notion on collateral
damage does not denigrate humans as means to an end, but rather stresses the preservation of a virtuous value: that
one may defend himself against unwarranted attacks on life and liberty (c.f. Yaganak 2011: 33). Note, of course, that
Kant could never allow the intentional killing of those innocent civilians.
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4. Conclusion
All in all, several important points have been revealed in this thesis. Firstly, I have debunked the
general  belief  that  traditionalist  principles  of  in  bello conduct,  –  non-combatant  immunity,
necessity, and proportionality – and the perception of liability to harm grounding them, stem from
deontological  considerations.  Instead,  I  have  aimed  to  depict  them  as  the  result  of  a  rule-
consequentialist approach to determining regulations of warfare. Contrariwise, I have shown that
one particular  strain of the revisionist  movement in  just  war theory,  cosmopolitanism, employs
principles for  in  bello behaviour  that  are grounded upon a Kantian comprehension of morality.
Specifically,  its  conception of liability is  Kantian because it  evaluates  actions by their  inherent
merits. Those different normative ethics have been shown to lead to opposed notions for the rules to
be  employed  in  war.  I  aspired  to  illuminate  these  conditions  and  their  implications  by  both
reviewing  existent  literature  and  using  original  arguments  and  examples  to  clarify  my  point.
Overall, my original hypothesis can be maintained: traditionalist and cosmopolitan rules of ius in
bello are incompatible because the normative ethics grounding them are diametrically opposed.
This conclusion is  essential  for the general understanding of the philosophy on morally correct
warfare, since it illuminates the controversial issues at hand from a previously unexplored angle.
Providing this angle, I hope to have delivered clarification on the controversial notions of  ius in
bello, for readers foreign to these issues and experts alike. Specifically, I hope to have adequately
introduced the reader to the intricacies of a cosmopolitan account of warfare, which might, hitherto,
have been alien to plenty of observes, acquainted or unacquainted with the ethics of war. While I
have specifically depicted the cosmopolitan theory of just war for reasons including its radicalness,
vividness, and innovation, I do not normatively judge if it is 'better' or 'worse' than the traditionalist
just war theory, or any other theory for that matter. Still, it has to be said that for all its innovation, it
is certainly not flawless. For example, it has been pointed out that Fabre's account of liability lacks
an adequate threshold separating the liable from the non-liable (Lazar 2014: 409ff.).
What  is  more,  it  has  to  be acknowledged that  the  cosmopolitan  theory of  just  warfare merely
represents one distinct subspecies of the general revisionist movement. The conclusions reached
regarding its ethical foundations cannot be generalized to capture the intricacies of all of revisionist
just war theory. There are plenty of theories deviating from the cosmopolitan view, especially in
regard  to  the  liability  of  non-combatants24.  An  extensive  comparative  analysis  juxtaposing  the
24 Notable contributions include Lazar, Seth 2015. Sparing civilians. Oxford: Oxford University Press, and Frowe, Helen 
2014. Defensive killing. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
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normative ethics of revisionist just war theories with those of the traditional war theory is thus yet
to  be  undertaken,  although  it  seems  questionable  if  the  myriad  of  different  perceptions  within
revisionism allow for  valid  generalisations.  In  fact,  evaluating  the  different  revisionist  theories
might prove to become a great challenge for ethics in general,  as the diversity and quantity of
contributions in this field seems to ever grow.
What is more, it will be enthralling to observe if those newly developed notions of just warfare will
gain so much traction as to be incorporated in international humanitarian law, especially as the
traditionalist focus on nation-states seems partly obsolete, since inter-state wars decline and intra-
state wars appear to become the norm. This development is especially fascinating because of its
stark contrast to hitherto practised principles. One the one side, philosophers defending the doctrine
of the moral equality of combatants, for example, are rarely found today. On the other side, it is
inconceivable that states, the eventual decision-makers in international law, were to ever codify a
set of rules connecting the permissibility of acts in war with its ad bellum status of permissibility. In
any case, however, it is of great importance to stress the individual relevance moral philosophy on
war possesses, independent of its codification in law. In a way, morality, especially if its norms have
been internalized through social  construction,  is  a  more powerful  tool  than law: it  shapes how
individuals feel about their actions and guides the way we perceive human interaction. Hence, the
just war tradition, institutionalized or not, changes the way people perceive warfare by its own right,
as it is taught to soldiers, discussed by scholars, and included in public deliberations. 
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